What do fbi informants do

Douglas M. Charles does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment. As an FBI historian , I believe an examination of how the FBI has handled and used informants in the past will shed light on this current controversy.

Informants — an informal term for what the FBI really calls Confidential Human Sources — are, and always have been, one of the most basic sources of information in FBI and police investigations.

Informants are people who are already in a position to know or learn information and who willingly cooperate with the FBI. Such was the case with Dr. Alfred Gross , who had previously worked with the FBI and who in regarded a gay civil rights group he met as threatening because he viewed them as mentally ill. Others became informants because they were strong anti-communists during the Cold War, like Warren Scarberry , an informant I uncovered who believed he saw in the Mattachine Society of Washington the work of Communists.

He called and visited the FBI about this. Attorney's Office of the Guidelines' requirement to notify the U. Attorney of any unauthorized illegal activity by CIs. These results were one of the several areas in which the Criminal Division Chiefs indicated that the required interaction between FBI and DOJ personnel on informant matters is working well.

However, some of our findings and the results of our file reviews are in conflict with the Criminal Division Chiefs' positive assessment. As discussed above, in the course of our file reviews we identified Guidelines violations with respect to the required notifications regarding otherwise illegal activity, unauthorized illegal activity, and events surrounding the deactivation of confidential informants.

We also identified two cases in which the FBI failed to obtain proper authorization from the U. Moreover, the Criminal Division Chiefs indicated that they believe additional training for FBI Special Agents and supervisors and other measures are needed to promote adherence to the Confidential Informant Guidelines.

The following table describes the type of additional training they think is needed. Human sources are critical to the success of the FBI's criminal investigative mission and of other law enforcement and intelligence efforts aligned with that mission, including the efforts to prevent terrorism and address other emerging national security threats.

Our review focused on the FBI's implementation of Attorney General Guidelines for one category of human sources, confidential informants. The authorities and activities of other human sources, including assets and cooperating witnesses, are governed by different Attorney General Guidelines.

Nor did our review examine how the FBI coordinates all of its human sources who, since November 5, , have operated under the FBI's unified Directorate of Intelligence. Some senior FBI officials and many field personnel we interviewed believe the revisions were an overreaction and that the resulting Guidelines have generated widespread resentment among field personnel. Nonetheless, there is widespread recognition by FBI personnel we interviewed that criminal informants are vital to the success of the FBI's criminal investigative mission, and that the challenge for the government is to appropriately weigh the informant's value against the risk that the informant will commit unauthorized crimes or otherwise prejudice the government, and to monitor and supervise the relationship closely.

FBI personnel ranging from new agents to the Director told us that agents find the paperwork associated with opening and operating informants to be excessively burdensome and time-consuming. In addition, personnel in HIU stated that the current version of the Confidential Informant Guidelines is phrased in dense "legalese" that is hard for case agents to absorb, remember, and follow.

Although we were unable to quantify the precise impact of these issues, some of the field and Headquarters personnel we interviewed told us that some FBI agents are now reluctant to open informants because of these and other administrative and operational burdens. Our survey of Confidential Informant Coordinators revealed that the burden on case agents to complete the paperwork associated with the Criminal Informant Program is a major concern.

Approximately 70 percent of the Coordinators reported that case agents fail to devote adequate time to completing their paperwork or resist doing so. In addition, as the following diagram illustrates, the paperwork burdens of operating informants is one of the most frequently raised issues in their field offices.

The view that the paperwork requirements associated with handling informants excessively burden field agents was also cited in our interviews of FBI Headquarters personnel from the Criminal Investigative Division, Counterterrorism Division, Office of Intelligence, and Inspections Division. FBI Director Mueller told us that he frequently hears agents complain about the "burdensome" procedures for opening and operating informants.

In contrast, 10 of the 12 SACs in the field offices we visited said they believe the CI Guidelines are workable as written. They keep agents on track. Because of the Bureau's past fiascos, we need controls. Sometimes agents get sidetracked. He stated that his informant program personnel complete the necessary documentation for the agents if asked and were prepared to answer any questions regarding the operation of informants.

He characterized his agents as being "spoon-fed" on informant compliance issues. Notwithstanding the support available to agents in this field office, our review found that percent of the informant files we reviewed in that office contained one or more Guidelines violations.

In the course of reviewing informant files in 12 field offices, we were mindful of these concerns and sought to examine whether the reason for the complaints is the Guidelines themselves; other reasons that make compliance overly complex, time-consuming, and difficult; or a combination of these factors.

After evaluating the requirements of the Confidential Informant Guidelines and how they work in the field, we share the view of the majority of SACs we interviewed that the Guidelines themselves are not overly burdensome. Instead, we believe that the significant reasons for non-compliance are: inadequate administrative support for the Criminal Informant Program, including the failure to provide standardized forms, a field guide, and Intranet tools; failure by executive managers to hold first-line supervisors accountable for compliance deficiencies and to exercise effective oversight of agents operating confidential informants; inadequate training at every level new agents, probationary agents, experienced agents, Confidential Informant Coordinators, Supervisory Special Agents, senior field managers, and key Headquarters personnel , including periodic training on the Guidelines themselves and joint training with the U.

Attorneys' Offices on appropriate methods to operate confidential informants; inadequate support of Confidential Informant Coordinators and assignment of this responsibility as a collateral duty; failure to take compliance performance into account in personnel and promotion decisions and policies; and lingering differences between the FBI and DOJ over informant issues. Below we address each of these issues.

Inadequate Administrative Support. As has been well documented, the FBI has struggled to upgrade its antiquated computer systems for many years. Our interviews, field office site visits, and analysis of documents produced by the FBI reveal that three years after the May revised Investigative Guidelines were issued, FBI agents do not have FBI-wide, standardized forms to support the administrative steps required to operate confidential informants.

The FBI is capable of producing such forms; indeed, there is widespread use of automated forms throughout the FBI to support a host of administrative and operational programs. Some of these forms are out of date and some are under-inclusive or over-inclusive in what they require.

Because of the different practices used by the FBI's field divisions to administer the Criminal Informant Program, transferred agents must make needless, time-consuming adjustments to the unique, sometimes outdated, requirements of their new offices. The following table illustrates the wide discrepancies in data pertaining to Confidential Informant Guidelines' requirements that is collected in various forms maintained in 7 of the 12 field offices we visited.

Complicating the agent's task even further is the fact that there is no one place on the FBI's Intranet where an agent who wants to initiate the registration of an informant can look for guidance regarding the approval and operation of CIs.

Consequently, it is easy to understand the frustration expressed by field office personnel in explaining compliance deficiencies when it is so difficult for agents to find the various requirements, and standardized administrative tools are not available. Another impediment to compliance with the Guidelines is the absence of a field manual comparable to the one provided for undercover operations by the Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit USOU , which we discuss in Chapter Four.

Several field offices, including Newark and Knoxville, have generated their own handbooks or manuals to fill this void. However, the best practices and time-saving devices that have evolved over the years in the field have not led to the development of a uniform field guide for all agents. Some analysts have instituted tickler systems and other mechanisms to promote timely compliance.

While this support is helpful, we believe the FBI needs an agency-wide, standardized system which can be accessed at Headquarters and in the field. Because its internal human source policies, practices, and manuals must account for and comply with the Attorney General's Guidelines, the FBI enlisted DOJ to assist in the re-engineering effort.

The working group's goals are to develop new guidelines, policies, and processes for the utilization of confidential human sources that are designed to reduce burdensome paperwork, standardize source administration procedures, clarify compliance requirements, and improve Guidelines compliance.

Headquarters officials, field managers, Informant Coordinators, and Division Counsel we interviewed identified the first-level supervisor as the linchpin to ensuring FBI agents are held accountable for compliance with the Confidential Informant Guidelines. Our review indicated, however, that some field supervisors have failed to identify risks associated with operating informants. For example, Supervisory Special Agents SSAs are required every 90 days to conduct reviews of all confidential informant files, or, in the case of privileged informants, every 60 days.

During this review, they are to note a variety of information, including Guidelines compliance deficiencies pertaining to payments, criminal history checks, authority to engage in otherwise illegal activity, and continuing suitability.

We saw many instances where file reviews were not performed timely and deficiencies were not resolved promptly. See also Chapter 7, Case Study 7. Beyond the general issue of timely compliance with the Guidelines, we believe, based on our field and Headquarters interviews and survey responses, that some field supervisors have historically failed to be as fully engaged as needed to identify risks associated with operating informants. Our findings with respect to supervisory approval and monitoring of "otherwise illegal activity" and notifications regarding the occurrence of unauthorized illegal activity are particularly notable in this regard.

With respect to otherwise illegal activity, as illustrated in Table 3. In each of these instances, field supervisors failed to exercise their responsibility to ensure that, as supervisors, they followed these Guidelines' provisions. On November 8, , the Assistant Director of CID sent a candid self-assessment to all FBI field offices, the apparent purpose of which was to communicate the Division's concerns about these compliance deficiencies and to clarify related field guidance.

Among its conclusions, the CID stated that one of the factors contributing to the present state of the Criminal Informant Program was "a failure on the part of field office managers to effectively exercise oversight" of the program. In particular, with respect to the critical role executive managers and supervisors play in approving otherwise illegal activity, CID made the following observation: [Executive managers] and Supervisors, when reviewing reauthorizations, must ensure OIA authority requested is commensurate with the completed activity, for example, the previous OIA was to purchase drugs; however, during the authorization period, the source also purchased weapons.

Subsequent justification, authority and concurrence must extend to weapons. There were instances noted wherein requests for OIA authorization did not include sufficient justification and failed to note, with specificity , the activity ies authorized for the source.

There were instances in which OIA admonishments were backdated, completed by an agent other than the agent administering the admonishments, not administered within the authorized time frame, or simply not administered. Cause: The assessment identified the following as factors contributing to the rate of non-compliance in this area: Lack of familiarity with guidelines' requirement; a deficiency on the part of Executive Managers to exercise adherence to and oversight of guidelines requirements; and a failure to recognize the implications of providing a "blank check" endorsement for a source to participate in criminal activity.

Emphasis in original. Among CID's general conclusions were that "despite the identification of non-compliance issues, there was a high rate of recurrence or failure to remedy those identified issues" and that "outside of mitigation, there was no accountability for identified non-compliance in the program. We found two instances in which required notifications did not go to the U. Attorney's Office at all and three occasions when the required notification either did not go from the SAC or to the U.

Attorney, or both. Attorney was required. This was due primarily to the lack of information concerning whether a state or local prosecuting office had filed charges against the informant. We believe it is critically important for FBI supervisors and Headquarters officials to be aware when CIs engage in unauthorized illegal activity and to exercise oversight to ensure that agents do not inappropriately insert themselves into state or local proceedings against the informant or otherwise act inappropriately when FBI informants are at risk.

In addition, it is important that the FBI not continue its relationship with informants who, on balance, present greater risks than benefits. Because the Guidelines provide that the U. Attorneys' Offices and the DOJ's Criminal Division are to bring their judgments to bear on whether the FBI should continue to utilize CIs who have committed unauthorized illegal activity, it is important that FBI supervisors ensure that prosecutors are notified as required.

The FBI's failure to track whether state or local charges have been filed against CIs who commit unauthorized crimes is a significant gap in its oversight of confidential informants. We believe that the failure of some executive managers to ensure that first-line supervisors and ASACs are held accountable for Guidelines violations by those under their supervision should be remedied promptly.

Inadequate Training At Every Level. We believe that another reason for the FBI's high non-compliance rate with the Confidential Informant Guidelines is the absence of regular training of field agents and supervisors on the risks of handling confidential informants, failure to identify best practices to use in managing informants, and the absence of joint training with the U. We outline in Chapter Eight our concerns about the FBI's failure to develop and implement a comprehensive training program to acquaint field agents, their supervisors, and Headquarters personnel with the requirements of the four Investigative Guidelines.

With respect to the Confidential Informant Guidelines in particular, the FBI was provided specific direction concerning training. Section I. The agency specific guidelines must ensure, at a minimum, that the JLEA's agents receive sufficient initial and in service training in the use of CIs consistent with these Guidelines, and that compliance with these Guidelines is considered in the annual performance appraisal of its agents.

As part of such compliance the JLEA shall designate a senior official to oversee all aspects of its CI program, including the training of agents; registration, review and terminiation of CIs; and notificications to outside entities. In November , FBI Headquarters initiated a mandatory "Back to Basics" lesson plan for all assigned Special Agents, including managers, on the operation of human sources.

These sessions included 80 hours of training for approximately 15 Confidential Informant Coordinators and other field personnel who were assigned to Headquarters about the administrative oversight of informants and other human sources.

The FBI provided blocks of instruction on source administration in nine regional training sessions for a total of approximately Supervisory Special Agents, Special Agents, and task force officers between May and October , and five Informant Development in-service training sessions between January and February for a total of approximately experienced Special Agents. Prior to the June training session, the last in-service advanced training provided on informant development was in September It also provided a block of training on the CI Guidelines at a specialized conference on health care fraud and at a white collar crime conference for ASACs.

At the field level, Informant Coordinators told us that they have conducted formal and informal training sessions, posted information about the revised Guidelines on field office computer systems, and distributed answers to frequently asked questions. Yet, despite these training efforts, our review found that more training is needed to improve compliance with the Guidelines. For example, Confidential Informant Coordinators do not have a regular training regimen.

They do not meet on an annual basis, and there are no regional or local training opportunities that focus on Guidelines issues. Seventy-two percent of the Informant Coordinators indicated that Division Counsel should provide additional training on the CI Guidelines to Special Agents and supervisors in their field offices. Several Informant Coordinators suggested that training go beyond simple instruction on what the Guidelines require.

For example, one Informant Coordinator said: We have many new agents in the Bureau. Most of them, I feel, look at a source as a necessary evil instead of a valuable tool towards investigative success. I try to counsel new agents that working sources can be interesting and somewhat enjoyable, and certainly can be a huge help to any investigation. Training towards that end, i.

The Informant Coordinators' views on the need for additional training were shared by Division Counsel, whose responses to our survey indicated a need for additional training of agents, supervisors, and Division Counsel. In addition to these survey findings, some FBI personnel believed that ambiguities or lack of sufficient detail in some of the Guidelines' requirements were impediments to compliance, and that clarification and supplemental guidance are needed. For example, field and Headquarters personnel indicated in response to our survey and in interviews that the FBI should issue clarifying guidance regarding the following issues.

Attorney's Office begins to exert direction and control of the investigation? What controls should be instituted to maximize the reliability of online communication with confidential informants? What is the appropriate use of illegal aliens as confidential informants? In addition, the CID's November 8, , self-assessment acknowledged that specific shortcomings in FBI training have impacted the operation of confidential informants.

The CID assessment concluded that agents were not well-informed about the need to comply with time-sensitive Guideline requirements such as instructions, initial suitability inquiry periods, and the annual continuing suitability reviews.

CID concluded that agents had a "misconception regarding the flexibility of time-sensitive issues" and wrongly "assumed that there is a 'grace period' associated with deadlines in the Asset and Informant Programs.

Confidential Informant Coordinators play a critical role in ensuring that the Guidelines are followed. However, we learned that 28 of 56 Informant Coordinators, or 50 percent, perform these duties as a "collateral duty" while handling other assignments. A prominent issue that arose in our survey was the frustration of some Coordinators with the competing demands of these other duties.

In our survey, 41 percent of Informant Coordinators reported that they do not have sufficient time to manage the Criminal Informant Program in their field offices, and 78 percent of these Coordinators attributed this to "too many collateral duties.

While we believe that not all field offices can justify having a full-time Informant Coordinator, the FBI should consider the workload of Informant Coordinators in large field offices and whether they have sufficient time to handle their critical duties as Informant Coordinators. We also heard from both Informant Coordinators and executive managers that it would substantially assist the effectiveness of Informant Coordinators in larger field offices if executive managers had the discretion to elevate the Informant Coordinator position to a GS supervisory position.

Particularly in larger field offices, the challenges confronting Informant Coordinators in assisting agents and in being available to address problems and mitigate risks involving informants, may be sufficiently complex and sophisticated that they merit a GS supervisory level appointment. One SAC of a large field office commented that unless this option is available, it will be difficult to attract and retain good Informant Coordinators.

We also found that the effectiveness of the Informant Coordinator varied greatly depending on a variety of factors. We observed that the most successful Informant Coordinators were those who had sought the job, had credible experience handling informants as case agents, had good working relationships with their SACs and ASACs, had strong organizational skills, and remained in the position for a sufficient period of time. In contrast, some Informant Coordinators selected for the position had no particular experience with informants or interest in the position.

One SAC expressed concern that resource constraints were prompting discussion about appointing non-agents to be Informant Coordinators, a move that he did not believe would be consistent with Guidelines compliance. The January revisions to the Confidential Informant Guidelines mandated that agency-specific guidelines "ensure, at a minimum. We examined the performance plans for Special Agents that were in effect from May 30, , to April 1, , and found that the FBI's annual performance appraisals did not contain this mandated critical element.

The only reference to the Attorney General Guidelines in the performance plans for GS to15 Special Agents and a corresponding provision for Senior Level Special Agents during this period is a generic reference in the first critical element, which states: Makes decisions in accordance with existing policies and procedures e.

However, the performance standards for Senior Level Special Agents do not incorporate any requirement to effectively manage and oversee compliance with the CI Guidelines. I of the CI Guidelines because there is no provision in the performance standards for all FBI agents and supervisors stating that compliance with the CI Guidelines will be considered in their annual performance appraisals. FBI agents who operate informants are credited with "statistical accomplishments" for the contributions the CIs make to investigative activities.

We learned that some Informant Coordinators, SACs, and Headquarters officials are not satisfied with the manner in which personnel policies account for the operation of human sources. Throughout the period of this review and until , FBI personnel were subject to a two-tiered evaluation system that limited supervisors to rating their subordinates as "meeting expectations" or "not meeting expectations.

As noted below, notwithstanding the generic critical element relating to the "Attorney General Guidelines" for GS and Senior Level Special Agents in effect for the last five years, we found that senior field managers do not consistently hold first-line supervisors accountable for Guidelines violations or even for persistent non-compliance. We were told in our interviews of the 12 SACs whose field offices we visited that most have taken or would take into account in weighing an SSA's promotion potential whether the supervisor was ineffective in promoting compliance with the Guidelines by agents under their command.

However, judging by the number and range of CI Guidelines violations we found, we do not believe that Headquarters management has made compliance performance a sufficiently visible issue at either the agent or supervisory level by integrating a satisfactory compliance record into the FBI's performance reviews and promotion policies.

In addition, we believe that the performance plans for GS and Senior Level Special Agents should be modified to evaluate senior managers on their own compliance with the requirements of the CI Guidelines and their effectiveness in ensuring compliance by their subordinates.

Another issue we explored was the reward and incentive structure for Informant Coordinators. Most of the SACs we interviewed said that the current system for providing incentives to Informant Coordinators through quality step increases, awards, and promotions is adequate. Some Informant Coordinators said the task of promoting compliance with the Guidelines is time-consuming, often thankless, and tedious work, and should be recognized more often.

Many suggested that the FBI should make greater use of recognition ceremonies, Quality Step Increases, and cash awards both for highly effective Informant Coordinators and for agents who are exceptional performers in handling informants.

The revisions to the Confidential Informant Guidelines in January introduced wholesale changes into the manner in which informants are evaluated, approved, and operated. As we discuss in Chapter Seven, the confidential informants who are vetted by the CIRC undergo thorough scrutiny that assesses the risk-to-reward considerations in operating high-level, long term, privileged, media-affiliated, and certain other informants.

As for the balance of the FBI's informants and the day-to-day decisions agents must make to ensure they are compliant with the oversight mechanisms in the Guidelines, we believe another reason for the compliance irregularities we observed is the attitude towards DOJ oversight that persists with some FBI employees, coupled with a belief that the Guidelines are complex and burdensome. We observed different perspectives on this phenomenon throughout this review.

Most FBI executive managers and Headquarters officials we interviewed said they believe the Informant Guidelines are an essential tool for constraining the FBI's operation of informants, and most SACs and Headquarters officials we spoke with during this review defend the current version of the Confidential Informant Guidelines. However, some Informant Coordinators and field personnel we spoke to blame the DOJ for, in effect, punishing the FBI by imposing the burdensome Guidelines on the entire organization when there have been only a few aberrant episodes.

In addition, we were told that some FBI agents continue to believe that the FBI "owns" its informants and resent any obligation to disclose their identities to prosecutors or be told that they should close an informant in some circumstances. The FBI official said it might be a good idea, as long as the U.

Attorney's Office representatives were not "nervous Nellies. We were told by some FBI officials that the roots of this distrust stem from the FBI's historic concern that informants' identities may be jeopardized when prosecutors leave DOJ for jobs in the private sector, often as criminal defense counsel. As this report was being completed, the FBI was in the process of considering significant changes to the FBI's human source program. Regardless of whether the FBI retains the Criminal Informant Program as a separate program or integrates it into a more generic human source program, we believe the FBI needs to address the compliance deficiencies outlined in this report.

We also believe that some of the case agents' frustration with the Informant Guidelines would be reduced if agents and their supervisors had better administrative support, management tools, and periodic training. We therefore recommend that the FBI take the following steps. Develop and Implement a Compliance Plan. The compliance plan should specify the strategies that the FBI will employ to ensure compliance with applicable Guidelines governing the recruitment, validation, and operation of human sources and address issues such as administrative support e.

That manual should include compliance checklists and the standardized forms recommended above. The FBI should consider other administrative improvements to support the Criminal Informant Program, including a standard electronic Criminal Informant Program tickler system that can be deployed in all field divisions to generate non-compliance notifications to field and Headquarters managers, and an updated Intranet web page that includes the current version of the Confidential Informant Guidelines and key Office of the General Counsel guidance memoranda concerning confidential informants.

Attorney's Office in accordance with Section IV. The FBI should also ensure that Confidential Informant Coordinators are supervised by personnel of a higher grade level who are familiar with the Criminal Informant Program and who have received training on the Confidential Informant Guidelines. Provide Necessary Training. The FBI should also consider opportunities for local, joint training with representatives from U. Attorneys' Offices, which could address topics such as Guidelines provisions requiring approval, concurrence, or notice to the U.

Attorneys' Offices; the adverse consequences of Guidelines' violations from the standpoint of the prosecution and the FBI; and "lessons learned" from past cases. The training should also address frequently occurring violations of the Guidelines and MIOG provisions. A key objective of supervisory training should be on predictors of problems with confidential informants, such as long term confidential informants, confidential informants who have been assigned the same contact agents for an extensive period, confidential informants who are authorized to engage in otherwise illegal activity, confidential informants who have previously been deactivated "for cause," and confidential informants who have been arrested or engaged in other unauthorized illegal activity while working as confidential informants.

Sources used in foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence investigations are operated pursuant to the partially classified Attorney General's Guidelines for National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection NSI Guidelines. Informants operated outside the United States in connection with extraterritorial criminal investigations are operated pursuant to a separate set of Attorney General Guidelines, which are classified.

Officials in the FBI's Human Intelligence Unit explained that when "high echelon" informants were eliminated in the revised Guidelines issued by the Attorney General in January and "high level" informants were introduced as a new category, few FBI informants qualified under the new definition.

Confidential informants are used by the FBI in a variety of domestic and international terrorism investigations where the investigative objective is a criminal prosecution.

In March , both defendants were convicted of conspiring to provide material support to the Al Qaeda and Hamas terrorist groups. Doe, No. Connolly, F. Among the types of misconduct chronicled in the report were sexual relationships between informants and agents and improper disclosure of information to informants.

DOJ OPR concluded that the authorization story was invented after the fact to protect a highly valued informant, even though Presser was deactivated when he became Teamster president in DOJ attorneys also concluded that neither the Levi nor the Civiletti Guidelines were in place when Presser's informant relationship began, and, once the Guidelines were issued, there was no retroactive application to informants already serving.

Senate Staff Study at One of Presser's FBI handlers, Robert Friedrick, was later indicted for making false statements to internal investigators about his role in Presser's purported authorization by the FBI to engage in the scheme. The district court granted Friedrick's motion to suppress all statements made in the interviews on the grounds that they were inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment.

The court of appeals affirmed the district court's ruling. Friedrick, F. No additional charges were brought. The CI Guidelines impose other notification requirements in addition to the required notifications to the U. Attorney's Office when a CI is being prosecuted by or is the target of an investigation, is expected to become such a target, or has engaged in unauthorized illegal activity. These include the requirement to notify the U. Attorney's Office when a CI is named as an interceptee or a violator in an application for electronic surveillance, id.

D at B, and when the FBI "has reasonable grounds to believe that: 1 a current or former CI has been called to testify by the prosecution in any federal grand jury or judicial proceeding; 2 the statements of a current or former CI have been, or will be utilized by the prosecution in any federal judicial proceeding; or 3 a federal prosecutor intends to represent to a court or a jury that a current or former CI is or was a co-conspirator or other criminally culpable participant in any criminal activity.

C at B The informer's privilege is litigated in both civil and criminal proceedings. See, e. Gutierrez, F. Mathis, F. City of LaGrange, F. Four other categories of informants require special approval: federal prisoners, parolees, detainees, and supervised releasees; current or former participants in the witness security program; state or local prisoners, probationers, parolees, or supervised releasees, and fugitives. For purposes of authorizing OIA, the "appropriate Chief Federal Prosecutor" is the Chief Federal Prosecutor that " i is participating in the conduct of an investigation by a [Justice Law Enforcement Agency] that is utilizing that active CI, or is working with that active CI in connection with a prosecution; ii with respect to Otherwise Illegal Activity that would constitute a violation of federal law, would have primary jurisdiction to prosecute the Otherwise Illegal Activity; or iii with respect to Otherwise Illegal Activity that would constitute a violation only of state or local law, is located where the otherwise criminal activity is to occur.

Depending on the needs of the FBI, informants may have to find ways to get close to targeted individuals or to become part of a criminal organization or activity, if they are not already in such a position. Once they have an established role within the criminal organization or activity, the informant's role will be to provide information to the FBI about the organization, target or activity.

There are several ways to become an FBI informant. If the FBI has identified you as a person who has a connection to a criminal enterprise, activity or target, the Bureau may approach you to provide it with information. If you agree to work with the FBI, you will be assigned a handler, an FBI agent who will be your point of contact throughout the investigation. In exchange for such information, the FBI may offer several types of incentives for your cooperation.

These incentives may include monetary compensation, a reduction of penalties if you are involved in criminal activity, or complete absolution for your own crimes. If you are aware of criminal activity within an organization or by an individual, you may voluntarily elect to become an informant.

Individuals who have relevant information can go directly to the FBI with their information. While such tips can be provided anonymously, if you want to be an informant, you will have to provide your personal details.